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M O R E O N D E F E N D I N G R E L I G I O U S E X C L U S I V I S M : 
A R E P L Y T O R I C H A R D F E L D M A N 
P. Roger Turner 
In his "Plantinga on Exclusivism," Richard Feldman argues that A l v i n 
Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular 
problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman 
thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epis-
temic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) 
equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in 
equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradictory beliefs — 
in matters of religious belief. To demonstrate that Plantinga has so failed, 
Feldman introduces a principle, " B , " that purports to show that exclusiv-
ism (religious or not) tends to lead to unjustified beliefs. But 1 think that 
Feldman has failed successfully to show that B demonstrates exclusivism's 
tendency to lead to unjustified beliefs; so, in the paper, 1 defend Plantinga, 
and the exclusivist more generally, from Feldman's criticisms. 
I. Introduction 
In his "Plantinga on Exclusivism," 1 Richard Feldman argues that A l v i n 
Plantinga, i n an earlier paper,2 has not sufficiently addressed a particular 
problem for the religious exclusivist, that is, the sort of person who holds 
the fol lowing belief: 
Religious exclusivism: The belief that the tenets or some of the tenets 
of one religion are in fact true and, moreover, any propositions, in¬
cluding other religious beliefs that are incompatible wi th those tenets 
are false. 3 
1 Richard Feldman, "Plantinga on Exclusivism," Faith and Philosophy 20 (2003), 85-90. 
2 A l v i n Plantinga, "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in The Philosophical 
Challenge of Religious Diversity, ed. Phi l ip L . Qu inn and K e v i n Meeker (New York: Oxford 
Universi ty Press, 2000). 
31bid., 174. Some might quibble about the definit ion of "religious exclusivism" on offer, 
here. They might think, for example, that if the emphasis on "one" means to say "only one," 
then it's fair ly implausible that there even are any exclusivists by this definition. For, many 
religions share some tenets they hold to be true (e.g., all Abrahamic religions believe that 
there is just one G o d , that Abraham was a prophet, and so on). Two things I'd like to say to 
this line of thinking go as fol lows. First, I'm, of course, using Plantinga's definition of reli-
gious exclusivism since it's the one that both he and Feldman use. Second, 1 think the spirit of 
pp. 188-204 F A1TH A N D P H I L O S O P H Y Vol . 32 No . 2 A p r i l 2015 
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The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed suf¬
ficiently to address is the problem of acknowledged epistemic peer 
disagreement—that is, acknowledged disagreement between two (or 
more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, 
and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradictory 
beliefs—in matters of religious belief. Feldman concedes that Plantinga's 
counterexamples to a particular principle (we'll call it "A") regarding al¬
leged cases of epistemic peer disagreement (the sort of disagreement that 
purports to demonstrate how a person's being an exclusivist 4 wi th respect 
to one or more of her beliefs leads her to hold said beliefs in an epistemi-
cally unjustified way) are successful. But that's because A isn't a principle 
about cases of epistemic peer disagreement at all. It's really just about mere 
disagreement. So, he thinks that A is not the principle that undermines the 
exclusivist position. 
Instead, Feldman thinks it's another principle (we'll call it "B") that 
properly demonstrates how a person's being an exclusivist wi th respect to 
one or more of her beliefs, leads, in cases of epistemic peer disagreement, 
to the holding of said beliefs in an epistemically unjustified way. A n d it 
is this principle that Plantinga's counterexamples fail successfully to un¬
dermine. What's more, Feldman thinks there are no counterexamples to 
B, and so there are no successful defenses of exclusivist attitudes in cases 
of epistemic peer disagreement. So, according to Feldman, Plantinga has 
failed to show that an exclusivist could be justified in continuing to hold 
her belief in a case of epistemic peer disagreement. 
1n what follows, 1 intend to defend Plantinga and, more broadly, the 
religious exclusivist f r o m Feldman's arguments. 1 w i l l do this by offering 
three main objections: the first two by way of counterexample, and the 
last by way of posing a di lemma for the anti-exclusivist. O n the basis of 
these objections, I w i l l conclude that Feldman has failed to show that B 
demonstrates how a person's being an exclusivist wi th respect to one 
or more of her beliefs leads, in cases of epistemic peer disagreement, 
to the holding of said beliefs i n an epistemically unjustified way. A n d , 
if so, then Plantinga and (more broadly) the exclusivist are safe f rom 
Feldman's attacks. 
the term is obvious enough. There are surely religions that share tenets. But the point is that 
an exclusivist—as we're thinking about her here—is such that she thinks only her religion has 
all true tenets. So, though she can agree that there are other religions that have true tenets, 
she's committed to the idea that somewhere along the way, these other religions got some 
of their tenets wrong (otherwise they'd just be part of her religion). This, I take it, is the idea 
behind the term "religious exclusivism" at play, here. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
helping me clarify this point. 
4 For the sake of expediency, 1'll drop the "religious" part f rom "religious exclusivism," 
and, as 1 have here, "religious" f rom "religious exclusivist." So, 1'll just call the position 1'm 
defending "exclusivism," and the person w h o holds to "exclusivism" an "exclusivist." This 
serves for more than expediency, however. A s we ' l l see, the problem of exclusivism general¬
izes to any exclusivist belief whatever, religious or not. 
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II. How Plantinga's Counterexamples Successfully Defeat A, 
But Fail to Defeat B 
To begin, recall that Feldman grants that Plantinga's counterexamples are 
sufficient to undermine the fol lowing principle about alleged cases of peer 
disagreement: 
A : If (i) S has some good reasons ("internal markers") to believe P, but 
(ii) also knows that other people have equally good reasons ("internal 
markers") for bel ieving things incompatible wi th P, then S is not justified 
in bel ieving P. 5 
Feldman thinks that the sorts of cases that Plantinga cooks up are coun¬
terexamples to A . One such counterexample consists of a scenario in which 
Plantinga believes that racial bigotry is despicable, all while knowing f u l l -
well that there are others who have the same sort of "internal markers" 
(i.e., evidence, both sensuous and non-sensuous phenomenology, and the 
like) that he has, but believe the opposite. H e concludes that his belief 
that racial bigotry is despicable is justified nonetheless. Feldman thinks 
that all should agree that this is a counterexample to A . But he thinks we 
should all agree because A is a principle regarding mere acknowledged 
disagreement as opposed to acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. 
(That is, A is a principle regarding mere disagreement as to whether p 
between two [or more] parties i n which each party is aware of the other, 
dissenting, party, as opposed to disagreement as to whether p between 
two [or more] parties who believe each other to be equally competent 
thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good 
epistemic situations regarding, whether p.) A n d nobody thinks mere 
acknowledged disagreements necessarily result i n unjustified epistemic 
attitudes.6 
But to see why Plantinga's counterexamples fai l to address cases of 
acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement, consider the fol lowing case, 
another counterexample to A ; call it Researcher Case. 
Researcher Case (RC): Suppose a medical researcher does a careful 
study to examine the effectiveness of drugs E, F, G , and H for treating 
5 Feldman, "Plantinga on Exclusivism," 86. 
6 N o w , some might wonder whether or not Plantinga and Feldman wou ld concede that 
the bigot's reasons for thinking that bigotry is permissible are equally as good as Plantinga's 
reasons for thinking that bigotry is despicable. For they wou ld have to concede this in order 
for it to be the case that Plantinga's bigotry example suffices for a counterexample to A since 
(ii) of A says that Plantinga wou ld have to know that the bigot has equally good reasons 
for her bigotry-related belief. Given that Feldman does concede that the bigotry case is a 
counterexample to A , 1 think 1 can say that, at any rate, Feldman concedes that the bigot's rea¬
sons for thinking that bigotry is permissible are equally good as Plantinga's. Of course, this 
raises all sorts of questions about what makes competing reasons for belief as to whether p 
equally good. It also raises questions about moral epistemological issues. For example, should 
(in the moral sense of that word) the bigot believe differently than she does even if she has 
no reason to hold the competing belief? These questions go unexplored by either Plantinga 
or Feldman, but are worth further exploration. They are, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper; so, 1, too, w i l l leave them unexplored. 
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some disease. The study indicates that E works best. Suppose that at 
first this is all the information she has relevant to the issue. A t this 
point, we can assume, she is reasonably well justified in thinking that 
E works best. Suppose further that three other researchers have done 
similar studies, and one study indicates that F works best, another that 
G works best, and the last that H works best. N o researcher knows 
about any study other than his or her own. A t this point, each of them 
has reasons good enough to justify believing that the drug that d id best 
in his or her own study is in fact most effective. . . . But now suppose 
that [the original medical researcher] learns about all the other results. 
. . . She has her reasons and she knows that they have their comparable 
reasons.7 
Note that conditions (i) and (ii) of A are satisfied. 1s the researcher unjusti-
fied in her belief that E works better than its competitors? Not necessarily. 
For, as Feldman points out, we can add further details to R C such that 
both (i) and (ii) are satisfied, but the researcher is fairly obviously justified 
in continuing to hold her belief that E works better than its competitors. 
Consider one such addition we might make to R C . Suppose that the 
researcher knows about some flaws i n the studies of the other researchers 
and that these flaws are such that the other researchers could not have 
been reasonably expected to know about them; i n other words, these flaws 
are not the result of errors of reasoning or anything relevantly similar. 
Here we'd have a case where (i) and (ii) are satisfied (because the com-
peting researchers, we can assume, are still fu l ly justified in their believing 
as they do about their results), but our researcher is justified i n believing 
that E works better than its competitors. A n d this is precisely because this 
is not a case of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement; it's a case of 
mere acknowledged disagreement. 
To be clear, R C is a case of mere acknowledged disagreement (and not 
acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement) because, while our researcher 
is aware that her colleagues have come to different conclusions than the 
one she has come to, she has further evidence as to why her colleagues are 
mistaken or, at any rate, have come to different conclusions than the one 
she has come to. 1t's this having of further evidence that sets our researcher 
apart, epistemically speaking, f rom her colleagues. Or, put another way, 
she's in a better epistemic position than her colleagues. But if she's in a 
better epistemic position than her colleagues, then she's not their peer, 
epistemically speaking: in this regard, she's their superior. Thus, our re¬
searcher and her colleagues are not epistemic peers; and, if not, then R C is 
not a case of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. 
So, in examples that aren't cases of acknowledged epistemic peer dis¬
agreement, A's antecedent can be met without A's consequent also being 
satisfied. A n d R C helps us to see why: the researcher has evidence about 
7 Feldman, "Plantinga on Exclusivism," 87. 
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the other researchers' evidence that the other researchers lack. So, she's 
in an epistemically better position than her colleagues. A n d we can add 
similar details to the bigotry case, details that suggest the bigot is like our 
researcher's colleagues in that the bigot, too, has some flaws i n her evi¬
dence that Plantinga knows about (perhaps the bigot, through no fault of 
her own, was, and is, kept away f rom all equality-supporting evidence of 
any kind, and Plantinga knows this). Thus, we can see that A is false; it's 
subject to counterexample. Both the bigotry case and R C (at least when 
filled out in certain ways) successfully undermine A because, as in RC, in 
particular, it's clear that the subject of the counterexample is in an epis-
temically better position than her dissenters. 
But in a case of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement, this is not 
the case. The parties involved are stipulated to be in overall epistemic po¬
sitions that are equally good. Consider, then, the fol lowing anti-exclusivist 
principle that Feldman thinks sufficiently captures common intuitive re¬
actions to cases of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. 
B: If (i) S has some good reasons ("internal markers") to believe P, but (ii) 
also knows that other people have equally good reasons ("internal mark¬
ers") for bel ieving things incompatible w i t h P, and (iii) S has no reason 
to discount their reasons and favor her own, then S is not justified in 
bel ieving P. 8 
Here, it's alleged that B's antecedent does suffice for the truth of its con¬
sequent. So it is B that Feldman thinks is the principle that Plantinga's 
counterexamples need to, but fai l to, address. 
To be clear, Feldman thinks that Plantinga's counterexamples need to 
address B (as opposed to A ) because he believes that "Plantinga does not 
deal satisfactorily wi th an issue concerning the justification of belief when 
one knows that others have equally well supported competing beliefs." 9 
1n other words, when Plantinga says that he's wi l l ing to grant, for the 
sake of argument, that those of differing religious traditions than his have 
beliefs that "are on an epistemic par" wi th his own, 1 0 he's granting that he 
knows (or is otherwise justified in believing) that those in other religious 
traditions have "internal markers" that are comparable to his regarding 
his own religious beliefs. But, if Plantinga is wi l l ing to concede this, then 
it seems as if he's wi l l ing to concede that those holding different religious 
beliefs are his epistemic peers; that is, they have equally good reasons to 
hold beliefs that contradict his own, reasons that he can't properly or 
sensibly discount in favor of his own. A n d if B properly demonstrates 
how a person's being an exclusivist wi th respect to one or more of her 
beliefs leads, in cases of epistemic peer disagreement, to the holding of 
said beliefs in an epistemically unjustified way, then Plantinga w i l l have 
8 Ibid. , 88. 
9 Ibid., 86. 
1 0 Plantinga, "Plural ism," 181. 
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to come up wi th counterexamples that show B is false. 1f he can't do that, 
then he won't have successfully defended the exclusivist. 
III. Reconsidering Plantinga's Proposed Counterexamples 
Consider principle B. Do Plantinga's counterexamples fai l to engage B? 
1t's not clear to me that they do so fail . To see an initial reason why not, 
consider how Plantinga puts the case regarding racial bigotry: 
A m 1 wrong in thinking racial bigotry is despicable, even though 1 know 
there are others who disagree, and even if 1 think they have the same inter-
nal markers for their beliefs as 1 have for mine? 1 don't think so. 1 1 
Now, it's important to note that there are at least two ways we can take 
the question with respect to whether or not Plantinga is wrong in thinking 
racial bigotry is despicable even though he knows there are others who 
disagree and have the same sort of internal markers, and the like. We can 
take this question in a moral way: is Plantinga morally wrong in thinking 
that racial bigotry is despicable even though such and so? Or we can take 
the question in an epistemic way: is Plantinga epistemically wrong—that is, 
is he epistemically unjustified—in thinking that racial bigotry is wrong 
even though such and so? But, if the bigotry case is going to count as a 
potential counterexample to B, we'd better take the sort of "wrongness" 
to which Plantinga refers as being of the epistemic variety, since B is a 
principle about epistemic justification. So, taking the above question in the 
epistemic way, is Plantinga wrong? 
1 don't see any obvious reason to think so, for 1 think there are further 
details we can add to the bigotry case that make it clearly a counterex¬
ample to B. Before 1 say what 1 think these additional details are (or might 
be), let's first consider what Feldman has to say about Plantinga's racial 
bigotry case: 
But 1 doubt that there are specifications of the story about the bigot in 
which both conditions (ii) and (iii) of B [that is, the conditions that say S 
knows that other people have equally good reasons ("internal markers") 
for believing things incompatible wi th P, and that S has no reason to dis¬
count their reasons and favor her own] are satisfied. 1n some version of the 
story, those who favor bigotry do not have internal states on a par wi th 
Plantinga's. They may feel as strongly as he does, but 1 suspect that there is 
some sort of incoherence in their v iew or it requires an unjustified ad hoc 
acceptance of exceptions to general principles they endorse. (That's what 
makes it bigotry.) 1 2 
1 don't know just what to say about whether or not Plantinga's bigotry case, 
as he has it originally stated, meets conditions (ii) and (iii) of B. But 1 don't 
know that 1 need to know what to say. 1t doesn't seem to me that Feldman 
has offered any real reason to think that the bigotry case doesn't meet (ii) 
1 1 Ibid. , 182. 
1 2 Feldman, "Plantinga on Exclusivism," 89. M y insertion. 
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and (iii). A l l he's offered, as far as 1 can see, is what he suspects about the 
bigot; and that's not really much of an argument against Plantinga's bigotry 
case as a counterexample to B. 
Now, Feldman might respond that what he's up to, in the passage just 
cited, is trying to point out that Plantinga's bigotry case does not qualify 
as what Ernest Sosa calls a "refuting counterexample" to B ; 1 3 that is, he 
might claim that Plantinga's bigotry case does not offer the sort of coun¬
terexample that shows it's clearly the case that (ii) and (iii) of B are met. 
1nstead, Feldman might say, Plantinga's bigotry case offers, at most, what 
Sosa calls an "opposing counterexample," 1 4 a counterexample that shows 
it's not clearly the case that the bigotry case doesn't meet (ii) and (iii) of B. 
A n d what's more, if this is all Plantinga's bigotry case has done, then all 
should agree that Plantinga's bigotry case doesn't refute B; if anything, it 
merely opposes B. So, Feldman may conclude, the bigotry case is not a very 
serious threat to B at all (given the support B enjoys f rom our intuitive 
reactions to specific cases of acknowledged peer disagreement, etc.), even 
if it does offer some weak reason to doubt B . 1 5 
If this is how Feldman were to respond, then I take the point. Even so, I 
don't think it's clearly the case that Plantinga's bigotry case is merely an op¬
posing counterexample to B. Or, put another way, 1 don't think it's clearly 
the case that Plantinga's bigotry case isn't a refuting counterexample to B. 
For 1 think there are additional things we can say about (or add into) the 
bigotry case that make it more clearly a refuting counterexample to B than 
not. 1'll say more about this just below. 
For now, let's suppose that Feldman's comment "that's what makes it 
bigotry" suffices as a reason to think the bigotry case fails to meet condi-
tions (ii) and (iii) (i.e., it suffices as a reason to think the bigotry case, as 
stated, fails to meet the conditions of B that say S knows that other people 
have equally good reasons ("internal markers") for believing things 
incompatible with P, and that S has no reason to discount their reasons 
and favor her own). Bigotry, as 1 understand it, implies stubbornness wi th 
respect to some issue on the part of the bigot. So a racial bigot would 
be, 1 suppose, stubborn with respect to ideas of racial equality. A n d stub¬
bornness implies unreasonableness or unwillingness to consider another's 
beliefs, opinions, or whatever. 1f that's right, then the bigot case might not 
meet (ii), and almost certainly doesn't meet (iii) of B as it's currently stated. 
The "bigotry case" may initially appear to fai l to meet (ii) because 
stubbornness seems to rule out reasonableness, or the having of "equally 
good reasons." There is reason, however, to doubt this claim about the 
epistemological implications of stubbornness. To see why, consider the 
fol lowing f rom Thomas Kelly: 
1 3Ernest Sosa, "Review: Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology," Nous 27 (1993), 
51-65. 
1 4 Ibid. 
1 5 Thanks to E. J. Cof fman for alerting me to this possible objection. 
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1 think that we should admit that someone's belief might be reasonable even 
if his or her commitment to that belief is dogmatic [in the way a bigot is 
dogmatic in retaining his beliefs in spite of evidence to the contrary]. . . . The 
reason w h y even perfect dogmatism is consistent wi th reasonable believing 
is that whether one's belief is reasonable typically depends on the evidence 
that one actually possesses, and on the psychological relationship between 
that evidence and one's belief that actually obtains. 1 6 
Kelly's idea, 1 take it, is that condition (ii) can be met in cases of "perfect 
dogmatism" (e.g., cases like the bigotry case) because what determines 
whether or not a person holds some belief P reasonably is whether or 
not that person believes P on the basis of adequate evidence she actu¬
ally has and the sort of psychological relationship that holds between her 
belief and her evidence (most pertinently, whether or not she bases the 
belief on that evidence). This suggests that, even if a particularly dogmatic 
person holds her belief P at least in part because she refuses to consider 
evidence that runs contrary to her belief, she might still believe P reason¬
ably since the evidence she actually has supports P and she has the proper 
sort of psychological relationship between her evidence for P and her 
belief that P. 
Even so, though we can concede that (ii) (the condition that says that S 
knows that other people have equally good reasons ("internal markers") 
for believing things incompatible wi th P) may be met in the bigotry case, 
it's less clear that (iii) (the condition that says that S has no reason to dis¬
count their reasons and favor her own) is. For it seems as if stubbornness 
might be a good reason for Plantinga to discount the bigot's beliefs; the 
bigot, after all, is being hardheaded if nothing else. So, the bigotry case 
might not meet (ii) of B; but, even if it does, it's less than clear that it meets 
(iii). 1t's less than clear that the bigotry case meets (iii), Feldman thinks, 
because, for the bigot, "there is some sort of incoherence in [her] view or 
it requires an unjustified ad hoc acceptance of exceptions to general prin-
ciples [she] endorse[s]." A n d if so, then Plantinga may well have reason to 
discount the bigot's reasons in favor of her "anti-bigot" reasons, in which 
case (iii) isn't met. Thus, thinks Feldman, we have reason to believe that 
Plantinga's bigotry case fails to undermine B and, thereby, fails to defend 
the exclusivist. 
But 1 think reading the case this way (i.e., in a way that suggests the 
bigot is stubborn in his racially-related beliefs simply because this fits the 
definition of "bigotry") is less than generous. 1f bigotry is, necessarily, the 
sort of thing that involves "some sort of incoherence" or "an unjustified ad 
hoc acceptance of exceptions to general principles" that the bigot already 
endorses, then there's good reason to think that the bigot in question be¬
lieves unreasonably because she stubbornly refuses to consider evidence 
that goes contrary to what she believes. Or, even if not (as we saw wi th 
1 6 Thomas Kelly, "Fol lowing the Argument Where it Leads," Philosophical Studies 154 
(2011), 105-124, especially 110. 
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the quote f rom Kelly, above), reading the case this way certainly makes it 
clearer why Feldman thinks the bigotry case fails to meet (iii). 
So, let's think of Plantinga's bigotry case in terms of racism (simpliciter), 
and not racial bigotry. The idea 1 have in mind, here, is that a person might 
believe that her own race is superior to another's, but this belief isn't 
based in any way on incoherence or an ad hoc acceptance of exceptions to 
general principles she already endorses. N o w suppose that Plantinga (as 1 
assume he does) finds racism to be despicable. Further, suppose that there 
are those who disagree wi th Plantinga about racism while having the 
same sort of internal markers that Plantinga has with respect to his con¬
trary belief and, moreover, Plantinga knows that they have said internal 
markers and that he can't discount their internal markers in favor of his 
own (he can't discount their internal markers, we may assume, because, 
e.g., they haven't based their racist beliefs on anything incoherent or on 
an ad hoc acceptance of exceptions to general principles they already en¬
dorse, etc.). 1s Plantinga epistemically unjustified in continuing to believe, 
as he (I assume) does, that racism is despicable? 
1 don't see any obvious reason to think so. B, of course, says that it just 
follows f rom the racist case's meeting conditions (i)-(iii) that Plantinga 
is unjustified in continuing to believe that racism is despicable. But, is it 
really the case, even if we stipulate that the racist case meets conditions 
(i)-(iii), that Plantinga's belief is unjustified, that he's made some epis-
temic misstep? 1 don't see any obvious reason why. For suppose there's 
nothing in Plantinga's opponent's internal markers to which he can point 
and say "Aha! That's why she believes falsely that ~P (e.g., that racism 
isn't despicable)." Why should that indicate that Plantinga believes that 
P unjustifiedly? Perhaps it just seems to h im that P is true, and all while 
knowing ful l -wel l it plausibly just seems to his opponent that ~P. There's 
some reason to think that seemings can justify beliefs. 1 7 If so, then Plantinga 
can appeal to his seemings (and his opponent can do likewise). Or, per¬
haps, Plantinga can appeal to his intuitions (if intuitions come apart f rom 
seemings) about whether P. 1 don't see why we should think Plantinga's 
believing on the basis of his seemings or intuitions in a case like this entails 
his believing i n an epistemically unjustified way. A n d , 1 don't think that 
Feldman has given good enough reason to think that we should so think. 
Now, I can imagine an objection like the fol lowing. 
You've granted that seemings can justify beliefs. But Feldman claims 
that B enjoys support f rom our common intuitive reactions to cases of 
1 7 For example, see Dav id Barnett, "Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 82 (2010), 2 2 ^ 5 ; James Pryor, "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist," 
Nous 34 (2000), 517-549; Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (Lanham, M D : 
Roman and Litt lefield, 2001); George Bealer, " A Theory of the A Pr ior i , " Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 81 (2000), 1-30; Laurence Bonjour, In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Universi ty Press, 1998); Gideon Rosen, "Nomina l i sm, Natural ism, Epistemic Relativism," 
Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001), 69-91; and Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective (Cam¬
bridge: Cambridge Universi ty Press, 1991). 
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peer disagreement. Thus, by your own lights, these seemings, or intu¬
itions, justify our beliefs about cases of peer disagreement, and these 
justified beliefs are what support Feldman's (and many others') belief 
that B is the principle to which Plantinga (and now you) ought to re¬
spond. Thus, by your own lights, these seemings justify the belief that 
B is true. Moreover, B, in effect, disallows mere seemings f rom being 
justifying in peer disagreement. So, the issue then becomes whether 
the intuitive wallop of the counterexample even begins to approach the 
wide intuitive strength of B. 1n short, in virtue of your own recogni¬
tion of justification by intuition, instead of writing that Feldman gives 
no reason to think the counterexample fails, you should take up the 
Feldman claim that B enjoys wide intuitive support, and that for many 
people B has far more intuitive support than intuition gives to the coun¬
terexample you're offering. 1 8 
There are two ways in which 1 would like to reply to this objection. First, it 
is not Feldman's claim that B, itself, enjoys wide intuitive support. Rather, 
Feldman's claim is that B captures common intuitive reactions to cases 
of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. So, let us assume that we 
have particular intuitive reactions—i.e., "seemings"—with respect to cases 
of acknowledged peer disagreement that, thereby, justify our beliefs about 
those cases. Even if we do, this is not the same as saying that B, itself, en¬
joys such intuitive support. What B allegedly does is render verdicts about 
acknowledged cases of epistemic peer disagreement that align with our 
intuitions about those cases. Moreover, this objection seems to me to imply 
that 1 have argued for the claim that Feldman is unjustified in believing 
that Plantinga is unjustified i n his beliefs in the racist case. But, 1 have not 
argued that Feldman is unjustified in thinking (if he, in fact, thinks) that 
Plantinga believes unjustifiably in the racist case, or that B is true; for, 
this is not the issue i n question. Rather, what is at issue is whether or not 
Plantinga, in fact, is unjustified in his beliefs in the racist case. B was sup¬
posed to tell us that he is. I have argued that B fails to render such a verdict 
if seemings can justify beliefs. 
Second, it's not clear to me that B does rule out mere seemings f rom jus¬
tifying in cases of peer disagreement. But, let us suppose that it does. 1f it 
does, by virtue of what argument does it do so? So far as 1 can tell, Feldman 
does not offer any argument as to why we should think B properly rules 
out mere seemings f rom justifying in cases of peer disagreement. A n d 
since I have cited several philosophers who have argued that seemings 
can justify beliefs, we have no reason, yet, to think that such justification 
cannot happen in cases of epistemic peer disagreement—not, at any rate, 
without some antecedent acceptance of B. So, if the objection is right, then 
we have, here, a reason to think that B is dialectically improper. (1 mention 
another reason to think that B is dialectically improper, below.) 
181 owe this objection to an anonymous referee. 
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Returning, now, to the issue of what sort of counterexample to B 
Plantinga's bigotry case might be offering, let me attempt to justify my 
claim that Feldman's attempt to show that, at most, what Plantinga has 
offered is an "opposing counterexample" fails. For Feldman's critique 
of the bigotry case successfully to show that it, if anything, is merely an 
"opposing counterexample," Feldman has to show, among other things, 
that the bigotry case is not clearly a counterexample to B. But, more than 
that (and, more importantly, it seems to me), Feldman must show that it's 
more clearly the case that the bigotry case isn't clearly a counterexample 
to B than that it is. Recall, again, principle B: 
B: If (i) S has some good reasons ("internal markers") to believe P, but (ii) 
also knows that other people have equally good reasons ("internal mark¬
ers") for bel ieving things incompatible w i t h P, and (iii) S has no reason 
to discount their reasons and favor her own, then S is not justified in 
bel ieving P. 
Perhaps Feldman is successful in showing that the bigotry case, as Plant-
inga has it stated, isn't clearly a counterexample to B; that is, that the 
bigotry case, as Plantinga has it stated, isn't a counterexample that refutes 
B. Even so, just as Feldman adds additional details to his researcher case 
to make it clearly the case that it's a counterexample to A (i.e., B sans condi¬
tion (iii))—that it refutes A—1've added additional details to the bigotry 
case (e.g., Plantinga's having the relevant "seemings"; thinking in terms of 
racism simpliciter, etc.). These additional details, it seems to me, success¬
ful ly show that even if Feldman is successful in showing that Plantinga's 
original bigotry case isn't a counterexample that refutes B, he is not simi¬
larly successful when we consider the more detailed version of Plantinga's 
case that I describe. 
One further point before moving on. It seems to me that accepting a 
principle like B has an untoward consequence. Consider that Plantinga 
believes, for example, that Serious Actual ism (i.e., the metaphysical thesis 
that says no objects have properties in worlds in which they don't exist, 
not even the property of non-existence) is true. 1 9 Now, to be clear, it doesn't 
really matter, for our purposes, what particular metaphysical doctrines 
Plantinga holds to. What's important, is that Feldman is committed to the 
view that B implies one is, or would be, epistemically unjustified in ac-
cepting any such difficult metaphysical doctrines (like Serious Actualism, 
or anything else) as true. 2 0 That is, Feldman thinks that it is unreasonable 
to accept such a metaphysical doctrine if Plantinga's (or anyone's) belief in 
Serious Actualism (or some other difficult metaphysical doctrine) meets 
(ii) and (iii). A n d what's important to note about this is that the problem 
generalizes to any difficult academic theory (should one's belief i n this or 
that academic theory meet (i)-(iii) of B). 
1 9 Plantinga, "Plural ism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," 182. 
2 0 Feldman, "Plantinga on Exclus iv ism," 89. 
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But I think that if Feldman is right, then B is too strict. For, if B is right, 
then a junior-level philosopher can't reasonably disagree wi th those in 
her relevant field of study who are senior to her unless she has good 
reason to think they've done something wrong i n their philosophizing. 
But for a junior-level philosopher to have the relevant sorts of reasons to 
discount her senior colleague's beliefs, she'd have to have some evidence 
that her senior colleague has made some k ind of mistake or was other¬
wise less careful than she. But how could a junior-level philosopher ever 
come upon such evidence? A n d , even if she could, how likely is it that 
this sort of thing happens in fact (or, perhaps better: happens frequently 
enough to preserve the justification of all the "junior-level" beliefs we're 
inclined to judge as reasonable)? 1 don't see how this could be very likely 
at all; but this is fairly astonishing given that junior-level philosophers 
mature by figuring out what they take to be wrong wi th some or another 
of the things their senior colleagues believe. 1t seems to me that, in very 
many cases where a junior-level philosopher disagrees wi th a senior col¬
league, their differences in belief arise out of a difference in the way they 
evaluate the evidence concerning the belief; and "difference" doesn't nec¬
essarily imply "level of quality." 1t's true that the junior-level philosopher 
w i l l be committed to the belief that her senior colleague is mistaken, but 
it's plausibly not because she thinks he's not looked at the evidence as 
responsibly or as fu l ly as she has. Such cases seem to be the basis of rea¬
sonable philosophical impasse. 1f 1'm right about this, then we have another 
counterexample to B. Both the junior-level philosopher and her senior col¬
league meet conditions (i)-(iii) of B; yet, they're both justified i n believing 
as they do. 2 1 
2 1 A n anonymous referee objects as fol lows. 
You claim that B wou ld bar an academic f rom believing any controversial 
academic thesis and drive home the point wi th the example of the junior level 
philosopher. A n d this, you say, shows that B is obviously false. But it is not clear 
that this argument works because it might be argued that B deals w i th belief only. 
There are weaker propositional attitudes such as "acceptance" and "using as a 
work ing hypothesis." B does not apply to them. So, it might be argued that indeed 
when B applies to such academic disputes then a person really is not justified 
in having a belief that p. However, a person might wel l be justified in accepting 
p or keeping it as a work ing hypothesis. Do ing so is how advances are made in 
academic matters. The junior philosopher should not give up. The reason you 
might think it clearly false that one cannot believe in such circumstances is because 
you are thinking that one wou ld then have to just give up and close down. But 
this is not true, because of the weaker attitudes that can be taken up and con¬
tinued. A n d it can be argued that what we generally see among academics is in 
fact acceptance and not belief, because people act in deference to the acumen of 
other scholars. 
But 1 reply that this objection misses the point. 1 do not say that B is obviously false. A n d 1 do 
not say that B rules out advances in academia. For it is surely possible—and, perhaps, often 
actual—that academic progress is made s imply by academics asking "what i f " questions, 
questions to which they don't have a belief about the answer. What 1 say is that junior-level 
philosophers mature by figuring out what they take to be wrong wi th some or another of 
the things their senior colleagues believe. This implies that these junior-level philosophers 
take themselves to be right; that is, they disagree wi th their senior colleagues. The fact that 
200 Faith and Philosophy 
So, B seems subject to counterexample and, what's more, the conse¬
quences of accepting a principle like B seem to me to be untoward. Even if 
not, though, 1 think there's another problem for the B proponent: B forms 
the second horn of a dilemma that the anti-exclusivist w i l l have to face. 
1n the next section, 1'll construct the dilemma and show how the anti-
exclusivist is skewered on either horn. 
IV. The Anti-exclusivist's Dilemma and Other Reasons to Doubt B 
The first anti-exclusivist principle we looked at, A , is, as we saw, subject 
to counterexample. A n d B, too, might be subject to counterexample. But, 
even if B isn't subject to counterexample—or at any rate, even if the al¬
leged counterexamples 1've offered are unsuccessful—1 do not think the 
anti-exclusivist w i l l have gotten away unscathed. For, 1 think that there is 
trouble lurking for the anti-exclusivist in the form of a dilemma. Either she 
w i l l have to endorse A , or she w i l l have to endorse B, a principle that, as 
1'll argue, is dialectically improper. 
To see why 1 say that B is dialectically improper, recall just what B says. 
B says that if (i) a person S has some good reasons ("internal markers") 
to believe P, but (ii) also knows that other people have equally good rea¬
sons ("internal markers") for believing things incompatible with P, and 
also has no reason to discount the reasons of a disagreeing epistemic peer and 
favor her own, then S is not justified in believing P. Doesn't the clause "and 
also has no reason to discount the reasons of a disagreeing epistemic peer 
and favor her own" just mean that S has no reason to disagree wi th her 
epistemic peer? But the former clause is just (iii) of B; so, isn't (iii) just the 
definition of "unreasonable disagreement"? To put the point another way, 
mightn't 1 be able to restate B this way? 
many junior-level philosophers take their senior colleagues to be wrong about some issue or 
other is what gives rise to many junior-level philosophical projects like, e.g., a dissertation. 
Perhaps there are junior-level philosophers who approach a project like a dissertation f rom 
an agnostic point of view, or merely as a "what-if" project, but it seems quite implausible to 
me that even most do. But if 1'm right about that, and Feldman is right about B, then most 
junior-level philosophers who write their dissertation because they have a particular belief 
that conflicts w i th a senior colleague do so f rom an epistemically unjustified position. This is 
implausible and a reason to reject B. 
1 say this is a reason to reject B; but, 1 do not mean to say that this is a reason for Feldman 
to reject B, though 1 think he should. A s an anonymous referee points out, Feldman has, in 
recent work (see, e.g., his "Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement," in Epistemology 
Futures, ed. Stephen Heatherington [New York: Oxfo rd Univers i ty Press, 2006], 216-236, 
and his "Reasonable Religious Disagreements," in Philosophers Without Gods, ed. Louise 
A n t o n y [New York: Oxfo rd Univers i ty Press, 2007] 194-214), argued in such a way that 
it appears he might be comfortable w i th the notion that, for example, junior-level phi¬
losophers are epistemically unjustified in their positions if they disagree wi th a senior 
colleague w h o is their intellectual peer (or better). Maybe Feldman would be comfortable 
w i th this sort of skeptical conclusion. But, my point isn't just to show Feldman that he's 
w r o n g about B (because of its skeptical consequences, and etc.); rather, m y point is to offer 
compell ing reasons for th inking that Feldman's arguments do not go through, whether or 
not Feldman agrees wi th such reasoning. Or, in the words of the referee, my point about B's 
leading to untowardly skeptical conclusions "goes through whether Feldman recognizes 
the consequence or not." 
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B': 1f a person S meets (i) and (ii) and (iii') also lacks reasons (on balance) 
to disagree with her epistemic peer, then she disagrees unreasonably 
(that is, without reason) with her epistemic peer. 
If I can restate B as B' , then this principle does little by way of helping 
us see why an exclusivist is unjustified in her exclusivist beliefs. A l l B adds 
to A , as far as I can see, is the notion that if a person disagrees without 
reason, then that person disagrees unreasonably. But all should agree wi th 
a condition like that. The question left unanswered by Feldman, is why 
anyone should think that the exclusivist meets the relevant condition. 
1n particular, 1 see no obvious reason why the religious exclusivist 
should think that there really are any such cases that meet B's antecedent 
(in particular, (iii) of B). That is, 1 don't see why the religious exclusivist 
should agree that there really are any such cases of acknowledged epis-
temic peer disagreement. A n d , even if there are cases of this sort, it's not 
obvious to me why the exclusivist should think they apply to her sik im 
leben—her situation in life—at least wi th respect to her religious beliefs. 
Plantinga hints at this idea when he says: 
[The exclusivist] doesn't really think the beliefs in question are on a relevant 
epistemic par. She may agree that she and those who dissent are equally 
convinced of the truth of their belief, and even that they are internally on a 
par, that the internally available markers are similar, or relevantly similar. 
But she must still think that there is an important epistemic difference: she 
thinks that somehow the other person has made a mistake, or has a blind spot, 
or hasn't been whol ly attentive, or hasn't received some grace she has, or is 
in some way epistemically less fortunate. 2 2 
But Feldman thinks that, f rom the perspective of the exclusivist's oppo¬
nent, it doesn't matter what the exclusivist will think in a situation like 
this. What matters is whether or not the exclusivist has a reason to so think. 
Can't an exclusivist have a reason to so think? 1 don't see why not. For, 
as we saw in the last section, it's perfectly possible that, while an exclu-
sivist may lack insight wi th respect to some problem with her opponent's 
internal markers, she can appeal to her own seemings or, perhaps, her 
intuitions (if seemings and intuitions come apart, that is) as justifying rea¬
sons for thinking she's right and her opponent is wrong. 
Thus, the dilemma for the anti-exclusivist: either the anti-exclusivist w i l l 
have to accept A , or she w i l l have to accept B. If the anti-exclusivist accepts 
A , her principle is subject to counterexample (e.g., Researcher Case). If she 
accepts B, her principle might be subject to counterexample, but even if 
not, she has to accept B' . A n d once the anti-exclusivist endorses B under¬
stood as B', then the other premise of her anti-exclusivist argument—viz., 
the assertion of B's antecedent—is dialectically improper (since some of its 
explicit content is extremely close to the target anti-exclusivist conclusion) 
2 2 Plantinga, "Plural ism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," 182. 
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and not obviously met by the exclusivist. So, 1 conclude that B does little to 
help the anti-exclusivist's case against exclusivism. 
One final point about B. 1 think B is dialectically unhelpful in an addi-
tional way. To see what 1 mean, let's consider B in a somewhat anachronistic 
light. Consider what Roger White calls 
Extreme Permissivism [EP]: There are possible cases in which you rationally 
believe P, yet it is consistent wi th your being fu l ly rational and possessing 
your current evidence that you believe not-P instead. 2 3 
We might be able to imagine Plantinga endorsing something along the lines 
of EP. 1 don't know that Plantinga really does endorse EP, for EP commits 
one to the view that two believers wi th identical evidence can rationally 
hold contradictory beliefs on the basis of that evidence. A l l Plantinga is 
committed to, so far as 1 can see, is that two believers can have equally good 
evidence for their contradictory beliefs, and that's not what EP says. 
Even so, suppose Plantinga, or some other exclusivist, does endorse EP. 2 4 
1f he (or she, or whomever) does, it seems as if Feldman has, simply by 
fiat, given a principle—namely, B—that rules out EP. To see that B "rules 
out" EP, note, for example, that on EP 1 and my "evidential twin" (we 
might call it)—that is, another person who has the exact same evidence 
1 have wi th respect to whether p—can hold, in an epistemically justified 
way, contradictory beliefs on the exact same evidence. But if my evidential 
twin and I know about each other and what evidence we have for our 
competing beliefs, we meet all three conditions of B; for, we both have 
what we take to be good evidence in favor of our belief, but we also know 
that the other of us has equally good evidence (since it's the same evi¬
dence), and we have no reason to discount the other's evidence in favor 
of our own belief (since such a reason wou ld be further evidence, and ex 
2 3 Roger White, "Epistemic Permissivism," Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005), 445^59 , 
especially 447. Thanks to E. J. Cof fman for br inging this to my attention. 
2 4 A n d , indeed, it's plausible that some philosophers do (or could) hold a view like EP. A s 
Nathan Ballantyne and E. J. Cof fman point out (see their "Uniqueness, Evidence, and Ratio-
nality," Philosopher's Imprint 11 (2011), 1-13), there are several well-defended epistemological 
theories that are consistent w i th a view like EP. For example, there is Michael Bergmann's no¬
tion of an evidence-rationality bundle that features a proper-function account of rationality 
(see his Justification Without Awareness [New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2006]). O n a view 
like this, a person S "thinks that facts about one's proper functioning help determine what 
a given body of evidence rationalizes for one," so, "when [S] reflects on her evidence E for 
her belief p, she thinks it is possible that E rationalize a different attitude for her" (Ballan-
tyne and Cof fman , "Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality," 11). Or, for another (tastefully 
ironic) example, there is Earl Conee and Richard Feldman's endorsement of what they call an 
"explanatory coherentist" account of rationality (see their "Evidence," in Epistemology: New 
Essays, ed. Quentin Smith [New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 2008], 83-104). Fol lowing 
Cof fman and Ballantyne, again, on such a view, it's possible for a person S to reflect "on the 
evidence E upon which she has based her belief in p, then [judge it] possible that E rational-
izes some other attitude to p. For instance, she might realize that if she didn't so much as 
understand or grasp p, then p wouldn' t be an available explanation of E for her. A n d given 
that possibility, E wou ld not rationalize believing p for her; rather, it wou ld rationalize with¬
holding belief in p" (Ballantyne and Cof fman , "Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality," 11). 
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hypothesi, we have the same evidence). So, if B is true, then EP is false. 
But Feldman hasn't argued against EP at all on his way to (purportedly) 
establishing B, and EP can't be so easily dismissed. 2 5 So, I conclude that 
Feldman's use of B begs the question against at least some types of exclu-
sivists (in particular, EP-endorsing exclusivists). But, B was supposed to 
undermine exclusivism generally; so, 1 conclude that Feldman's use of B 
fails altogether.26 
V. Conclusion 
This concludes my defense of Plantinga and, more broadly, the religious 
exclusivist f rom Feldman's argument. 1t seems to me that revised versions 
of Plantinga's bigot case (e.g., the racist case) or, better, cases of philo¬
sophical impasse, are successful counterexamples to B. A n d , if not, then 
such cases provide ample reason to think that the consequences of ac¬
cepting a principle like B are untoward. But, even if accepting B doesn't 
lead to untoward consequences, 1 have shown that B doesn't do much to 
help the anti-exclusivist because B forms the second horn of a trouble¬
some dilemma. Either the anti-exclusivist w i l l have to accept A (i.e., B sans 
condition (iii) in the antecedent), which is subject to counterexample, or 
she'll have to accept B understood as B', and B ' is a principle that is dialec-
tically uncharitable because (as 1've argued) some of its explicit content is 
extremely close to the target anti-exclusivist conclusion. Moreover, it's not 
at all obvious that B's antecedent is met by the exclusivist since it's not at 
all clear that there actually are (or even could be) cases of acknowledged 
epistemic peer disagreement concerning religious beliefs. But, even if 
there are (or could be), 1've tried to show that there are other epistemi-
cally relevant considerations apart f rom reasons qua "internal markers" to 
2 5See footnote 24 for reasons to think E P has (or could have) something going for it and, 
so, can't be very easily dismissed. 
2 6 A n anonymous referee objects as fol lows. 
You argue that Feldman has begged the question against certain types of exclu-
sivists, v iz . , EP-endorsing exclusivists. You do this by supposing that Plantinga 
endorses EP, and then showing that Feldman has introduced a principle, B, that 
contradicts E P without so much as an argument as to w h y E P might be false (other 
than introducing B). But this argument is reversible. Feldman can just as quickly 
complain that he endorses B, and then along comes Plantinga who by fiat endorses 
EP that rules out B. You need to give a reason for thinking that the presumption is 
in favor of EP and not in favor of B , if the fiat argument is going to work. 
But 1 reply that this objection misses the context of the dialectic. The dialectic, as 1 see 
it, goes something l ike this. Plantinga argues that exclusivism doesn't necessarily lead to 
unjustified religious beliefs. His argument, we could say, provides reasons for thinking 
that E P is true. Thus, we might take Plantinga's original argument as an argument for E P 
(though, again, it's not clear that Plantinga endorses EP—the point is that an EP-endorser 
could use Plantinga's argument to support EP). Feldman responds by saying that exclu-
s ivism does necessarily lead to unjustified religious beliefs because principle B is true. The 
context is not such that Feldman introduces B , then Plantinga comes along and says "but, 
EP!" Rather, the burden of proof, at this point, is on Feldman. So, 1 conclude that my fiat 
argument does work . 
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which an exclusivist can appeal to justify her exclusivist beliefs; namely, 
her seemings or, possibly, even her intuitions. 
Moreover, Feldman's use of B begs the question against at least some 
types of exclusivists (in particular, EP-endorsing exclusivists); it presup¬
poses the falsity of Extreme Permissivism, an epistemological thesis that 
cannot be so easily dismissed. So, 1 conclude not only that Feldman has 
failed successfully to show that Plantinga's counterexamples to principle B 
fail , but he's failed to accomplish his broader goal of undermining the ex-
clusivist position in cases of acknowledged epistemic peer disagreement. 2 7 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
2 7 Thanks go to at least two anonymous referees, and the participants of the 2012 meeting 
of the Nor th Carolina Philosophical Society for comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
A n d special thanks go to E. J. Cof fman who read and provided comments for several f u l l 
draffs of this paper. 
